This paper addresses the security of public-key cryptosystems in a multi-user" setting, namely in the presence of attacks involving the encryption of related messages under di erent public keys, as exempli ed by H astad's classical attacks on RSA. We prove that security in the single-user setting implies security in the multi-user setting as long as the former is interpreted in the strong sense of indistinguishability," thereby pin-pointing many schemes guaranteed to be secure against H astad-type attacks. We then highlight the importance, in practice, of considering and improving the concrete security of the general reduction, and present such improvements for two Di e-Hellman based schemes, namely El Gamal and Cramer-Shoup.
Introduction
This paper addresses the security of public-key cryptosystems in the multi-user" setting, namely in the presence of attacks involving the encryption of related messages under di erent public keys. We present answers to the basic theoretical questions |namely what does security in this setting mean and for which schemes can we prove security| and then show how these results highlight a new di erentiating measure" between schemes, namely how security behaves as a function of the numberof users, making obvious the importance, in practice, of seeking schemes permitting improved security reductions in the multi-user setting. Such reductions are presented for the El Gamal and Cramer-Shoup schemes, showing that these schemes provide a better e ciency to security tradeo than some of their competitors when the e ect on security of the presence of many di erent users is taken into consideration 1.1 Background Two settings. The setting of public-key cryptography is usually presented like this: there is a receiver R, possession of whose public key pk enables anyone to form ciphertexts which the receiver can decrypt using the secret key associated to pk. This single-user setting |so called because it considers a single recipient of encrypted data| is the one of formalizations such as indistinguishability and semantic security GoMi . Yet it ignores an important dimension of the problem: in the real world there are many users, each with a public key, sending each other encrypted data. Attacks presented in the early days of public-key cryptography had highlighted the presence of security threats in this multi-user setting that were not present in the singleuser setting, arising from the possibility that a sender might encrypt, under di erent public keys, plaintexts which although unknown to the attacker, satisfy some known relation to each other. H astad's attacks. An example of the threats posed by encrypting related messages under di erent public keys is provided by H astad's well-known attacks on the basic RSA cryptosystem H a .
1 Suppose we h a v e many users where the public key of user U i is an RSA modulus N i and for e ciency all users use encryption exponent e = 3 . Given a single ciphertext y i = m 3 mod N i , the commonly accepted one-wayness of the RSA function implies that it is computationally infeasible for an adversary to recover the plaintext m. However, suppose now that a sender wants to securely transmit the same plaintext m to three di erent users, and does so by encrypting m under their respective public keys, producing ciphertexts y 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 where y i = m 3 mod N i for i = 1 ; 2 ; 3. Then an adversary given y 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 can recover m. Using the fact that N 1 ; N 2 ; N 3 are relatively prime, y 1 ; y 2 ; y 3 can be combined by Chinese remaindering to yield m 3 mod N 1 N 2 N 3 . But m 3 N 1 N 2 N 3 so m can now be recovered.
Several counter-measures have been proposed, e.g. padding the message with random bits. The bene t of such measures is, however, unclear in that although they appear to thwart the speci c known attacks, we h a v e no guarantee of security against other similar attacks.
Model and general reduction
The rst and most basic question to address is whether it is possible to prove security against the kinds of attacks discussed above, and if so how and for which s c hemes.
1 As H astad points out, the simple version of the attack discussed here was discovered by Blum and others before his work. His own paper considers extensions of the attack using lattice reduction H a . For simplicity w e will continue to use the term H astad's attacks" to refer to this body of cryptanalysis.
A general reduction. The above question turns out to have a simple answer: the schemes permitting security proofs in the multi-user setting are exactly those permitting security proofs in the single-user setting, as long as we use strong-enough" notions of security in the two cases. What is strong-enough"? Merely having the property that it is hard to recover the plaintext from a ciphertext is certainly not: basic RSA has this property, yet H astad's attacks discussed above show it is not secure in the multi-user setting. Theorem 4.1 interprets strong enough" for the single-user setting in the natural way: secure in the sense of indistinguishability of Goldwasser and Micali GoMi . As to the multi-user setting, the notion used in the theorem is an appropriate extension of indistinguishability that takes into account the presence of multiple users and the possibility o f a n a d v ersary seeing encryptions of related messages under di erent public keys. We prove the general reduction for security both under chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack, in the sense that security under either type of attack in one setting implies security under the same type of attack in the other setting. The analogous statement can be shown with regard to non-malleability DDN under chosen-plaintext attack, and a simple way to extend our proof to that setting is to exploit the characterization of BS . Non-malleability under chosen-ciphertext attack is equivalent to indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attack BDPR so is already covered.
We view ourselves here as establishing what most theoreticians would have expected" to be true. The proof is indeed simple, yet validating the prevailing intuition has several important elements and fruits beyond the obvious one of lling a gap in the literature, as we n o w discuss. Immediate consequences. The above-mentioned results directly imply security guarantees in the multi-user setting for all schemes proven to meet the notion of indistinguishability, under the same assumptions that were used to establish indistinguishability. This includes several practical schemes secure against chosen-plaintext attack BlGo, ElG , against chosen-ciphertext attack CrSh , and against chosen-ciphertext attack in the random oracle model BR, PKCS .
These results con rm the value of using strong, well-de ned notions of security and help to emphasize this issue in practice. As we h a v e seen, designers attempt to thwart H astad-type attacks by speci c counter-measures. Now w e can say that the more productive route is to stick t o s c hemes meeting notions of security such as indistinguishability. Designers are saved the trouble of explicitly considering attacks in the multi-user setting. The model. The result requires, as mentioned above, the introduction of a new model and notion. We want to capture the possibility o f an adversary seeing encryptions of related messages under di erent k eys when the choice of the relation can be made by the adversary. To do this e ectively and elegantly turns out to need some new de nitional ideas. Very brie y |see Section 3 for a full discussion and formalization| the formalization introduces the idea of an adversary given all public keys and a list of challenge encryption oracles," one per user, each oracle capable of encrypting one of two given equal-length messages, the choice of which being made according to a bit that although hidden from the adversary is the same for all oracles. 2 We will explain how this obviates the need to explicitly consider relations amongst messages. This model is important because its use extends beyond Theorem 4.1, as we will see below. Isn't simulation enough? It may appear at rst glance that the implication security in the single-user setting implies security in the multi-user setting for strong-enough notions of security is true for a trivial reason: an adversary attacking one user can just simulate the other users, itself 2 An encryption oracle is used in de nitions of security for private-key encryption BDJR because there the encryption key is secret, meaning not given to the adversary. One might imagine that oracles performing encryption are unnecessary in the public-key case because the adversary knows the public keys: can't it just encrypt on its own? Not when the message in question is a challenge one which it doesn't know, as in our setting.
picking their public keys so that it knows the corresponding secret keys. This doesn't work, and misses the key element of the multi-user setting. Our concern is an adversary that sees ciphertexts of related messages under di erent k eys. Give n a c hallenge ciphertext of an unknown message under a target public key, a simulator cannot produce a ciphertext of a related message under a di erent public key, even if it knows the secret key corresponding to the second public key, because it does not know the original message. Indeed, our proof does not proceed by this type of simulation.
The need for concrete security improvements
Perhaps the most important impact of the general reduction of Theorem 4.1 is the manner in which it leads us to see the practical importance of concrete security issues and improvements for the multi-user setting.
Suppose we have a system of n users in which each user encrypts up to q e messages. We x a public-key cryptosystem P Eused by all users. Theorem 4.1 says that the maximum probability that an adversary with running time t can compromise security in the multi-user setting |this in the sense of our de nition discussed above| is at most q e n times the maximum probability that an adversary with running time closely related to t can compromise security in the standard sense of indistinguishability. Notationally, Adv n-cpa P E ;I t; q e q e n Adv 1-cpa P E ;I t 0 where t 0 t. Here I represents any possible information common to all users and should be ignored at a rst reading, and the technical term for the maximum breaking probabilities" represented by the notation is advantage". It follows that if any poly-time adversary has negligible success probability i n the single-user setting, the same is true in the multi-user setting. This corollary is what we have interpreted above as saying that the schemes secure in the single-user setting are exactly those secure in the multi-user setting". However, what this theorem highlights is that the advantage in the multi-user setting may be more than that in the single-user setting by a factor of q e n. Security can degrade linearly as we add more users to the system and also as the users encrypt more data.
The practical impact of this is considerable. Here's an example to illustrate. Assume we h a v e a Di e-Hellman based scheme modulo a prime p whose size was chosen based only on consideration of the single-user setting, say to ensure that Adv 1-cpa P E ;I t 0 2 ,60 , for some appropriately large t 0 .
This would beaquite acceptable security guarantee in the single-user setting. Now consider the real" setting, which is the multi-user one. Say there are up to 200 million users with public keys. This may not be true today, but we should budget for a large growth in the use of public-key cryptosystems with time. Let's say we allow q e = 2 30 messages to beencrypted under each key.
Then q e nAdv 1-cpa P E ;I t 0 i s 0 : 2, meaning essentially no security guarantee remains in the multi-user setting. To h a v e a breaking probability in the multi-user setting bounded by the original target of 2 ,60 we w ould have to increase the size of p. Even a small increase in the size of p will impact the e ciency of the scheme quite a lot because the cost of encryption is a cubic function of the size of p.
To get some rough numerical estimates, assume the advantage in the single-user setting is of the form t 0 =Oe 1:9lnp 1=3 lnlnp 2=3 and q e n 2
60
. If we w anted the advantage in the multi-user setting to be the same as that yielded by a 1024 bit prime in the single-user setting, whatever this value might be,then we would have to use a prime of about 1720 bits, meaning the cost of encryption would increase by a factor of about 4.7.
It is natural to ask whether the gap in advantages exhibited in Theorem 4.1 is real or an artifact of our proof. We prove in Proposition 4.3 that there is no general reduction better than ours: if there is any secure scheme, there is also one whose advantage in the two settings provably di ers by a factor of q e n. So we can't expect to reduce the security loss in general. But we can still hope that there are speci c schemes for which the security degrades less quickly as we add more users to the system. These schemes become attractive in practice because for a xed level of security they have lower computational cost than schemes not permitting such improved reductions. We next point to two popular schemes for which we can provide new security reductions illustrating such improvements.
Concrete security of El Gamal in the multi-user setting
The El Gamal scheme in a group of prime order can beproven to have the property of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack in the single-user setting under the assumption that the decision Di e-Hellman DDH problem is hard. This simple observation is made for example in NaRe, CrSh . The reduction is essentially tight, and in our language says that Adv 1-cpa E G ; q;g t |the maximum probability that an adversary of time-complexity t can break the El Gamal scheme via a chosen-plaintext attack in the single-user setting| is at most 2Adv ddh q;g t |twice the maximum probability of solving the DDH problem in the same amount of time. Here g is a generator of the group G of a large prime order q. We thus have a complete and satisfactory picture of the security of the El Gamal scheme in the single-user setting; our concern now is the multi-user setting.
Theorem 4.1 together with the above implies that Adv n-cpa E G ; q;g t; q e |the maximum probability that an adversary of time-complexity t can break the El Gamal scheme via a chosen-plaintext attack in the presence of n users each encrypting q e messages| is upper bounded by 2q e n Adv ddh q;g t 0 |2q e times the maximum probability of solving the DDH problem in the time t 0 | where t 0 t. We show in Theorem 5.3 that via an improved reduction the factor of q e n can beessentially eliminated. Namely Adv n-cpa E G ; q;g t; q e is upper bounded roughly by 2Adv ddh q;g t 0 where t 0 equals t plus an additive term that depends on n; q e . In other words, the maximum probability of breaking the El Gamal scheme under chosen-plaintext attack, even in the presence of n users each encrypting q e messages, remains tightly related to the probability of solving the DDH problem in comparable time. As discussed above, this translates into considerable cost savings in practice.
Our reduction exploits a self-reducibility property of the decisional Di e-Hellman problem due to Stadler and Naor-Reingold St, NaRe , and a variant thereof that was also independently noted by Shoup Sh . See Lemma 5.2.
1.5 Concrete security of Cramer-Shoup in the multi-user setting The El Gamal scheme provides security against chosen-plaintext attack. Nowadays there is much interest and need also for practical schemes provably achieving security against chosen-ciphertext attack. The Cramer-Shoup scheme CrSh is shown to achieve indistinguishability under chosenciphertext attack in the single-user setting assuming the DDH problem is hard. Their reduction of the security of their scheme to that of the DDH problem is essentially tight. Applying our general result to bound the advantage in the multi-user setting would indicate degradation of security by a factor of q e n. We present in Theorem 5.4 an improved reduction which roughly speaking reduces the factor of q e n to a factor of q e only. Thus the maximum probability of breaking the Cramer-Shoup scheme under chosen-ciphertext attack, in the presence of n users, each encrypting q e messages, is about the same as is proved if there was only one user encrypting q e messages. The result is not as strong as for El Gamal because we have not eliminated the factor of q e , but this is an open problem even when there is only one user. This new result exploits Lemma 5.2 and features of the proof of security for the single-user case given in CrSh .
Discussion and related work
It is important to con rm |as we did| that the notion of indistinguishability i s strong enough to also imply security in the multi-user setting. If security in the polynomial-time framework is the only concern, we can stop here: the two notions are equivalent. But if we wish to use the theoretical results in practice we m ust be careful which model we use as the basis for selecting the size of security parameters in schemes. The multi-user setting is the real" one, and thus when we choose a security parameter size it should be with the target of having some guaranteed bound on the probability of the scheme being broken in the multi-user setting, not the single-user one. This means we must have a clear model of security for the multi-user setting and quantitative bounds on adversarial advantage, in this setting, for schemes we want to consider. Once we do this we see that some schemes become preferable to others due to their better security, translating into improved e ciency for a given level of security.
A special case of interest in these results is when n = 1 . Meaning we are back in the single-user setting, but are looking at an extension of the notion of indistinguishability in which one considers the encryption of up to q e messages. Our results provide improved security for the El Gamal scheme in this setting.
The improved reductions we have exhibited for Di e-Hellman based schemes are possible because all users can work over the same group |speci ed by a public prime q| y et have di erent
trapdoors. Such improvements are unlikely for RSA or factoring based schemes where the moduli must bedi erent for each user. Thus our improved reductions highlight an advantage of Di eHellman based schemes: they admit better proven-security to cost tradeo s in the multi-user setting than schemes based on some other assumptions. The questions raised here can also be raised in the private-key setting: what happens there when there are many users? The ideas of the current w ork are easily transfered. The de nitions of BDJR for the single-user case can be adapted to the multi-user case using the ideas in Section 3. The analogue of Theorem 4.1 for the private-key setting is then easily proven.
Baudron, Pointcheval and Stern have independently considered the problem of public-key encryption in the multi-user setting BPS . Their notion of security for the multi-user setting |also proved to be polynomially-equivalent to the standard notion of single-user indistinguishability| is slightly di erent from ours. They do not consider concrete-security or any speci c schemes. The di erence in the notions is that they do not use the idea of encryption oracles; rather, their adversary must output a pair of vectors of plaintexts and get back a s c hallenge a corresponding vector of ciphertexts. This makes their model weaker since the adversary does not have adaptive power. If only polynomial-security is considered, their notion, ours and the single-user one are all equivalent, but when concrete security is considered, our notion is stronger.
A preliminary version of this paper appears as BBM .
De nitions
We specify a concrete-security v ersion of the standard notion of security of a public-key encryption scheme in the sense of indistinguishability. We consider both chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks.
First recall that a public-key encryption scheme P E= K ; E ; D consists of three algorithms. The key generation algorithm K is a randomized algorithm that takes as input some global information I and returns a pair pk; sk o f k eys, the public key and matching secret key, respectively; we write pk; sk R K I . Here I includes a security parameter, and perhaps other information. For example in a Di e-Hellman based scheme, I might include a global prime number and generator of a group which all parties use to create their keys. The encryption algorithm E is a randomized algorithm that takes the public key pk and a plaintext M to return a ciphertext C; w e write C R E pk M. The decryption algorithm D is a deterministic algorithm that takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext C to return the corresponding plaintext M; we write M D sk C. Associated to each public key pk is a message space MsgSppk from which M is allowed to bedrawn. We require that D sk E pk M = M for all M 2 MsgSppk.
An adversary B runs in two stages. In the nd" stage it takes the public key and outputs two equal length messages m 0 ; m 1 together with some state information s. In the guess" stage it gets a challenge ciphertext C formed by encrypting a random one of the two messages, and must say which message was chosen. Below the superscript of 1" indicates that we are in the single-user setting, meaning that although there may be many senders, only one person holds a public key and is the recipient o f encrypted information. In the case of a chosen-ciphertext attack the adversary gets an oracle for D sk and is allowed to invoke i t o n a n y point with the restriction of not querying the challenge ciphertext during the guess stage RaSi .
De nition 2.1 Indistinguishability of encryptions Let The time-complexity" is the worst case execution time of the associated experiment plus the size of the code of the adversary, in some xed RAM model of computation. Note that the execution time refers to the entire experiment, not just the adversary. In particular, it includes the time for key generation, challenge generation, and computation of responses to oracle queries if any. The same convention is used for all other de nitions in this paper and will not be explicitly mentioned again. The advantage function is the maximum likelihood of the security of the encryption scheme P Ebeing compromised by an adversary, using the indicated resources, and with respect to the indicated measure of security.
De nition 2.2 We s a y that P Eis polynomially-secure against chosen-plaintext attack resp. chosenciphertext attack in the single-user setting if Adv Here complexity is measured as a function of a security parameter that is contained in the global input I. If I consists of more than a security parameter as in the El Gamal scheme, we x a probabilistic generator for this information and the probability includes the choices of this generator.
3 Security in the multi-user setting
We envision a set of n users. All users use a common, xed cryptosystem P E= K ; E ; D . User i has a public key pk i and holds the matching secret key sk i . It is assumed that each user has an authentic copy of the public keys of all other users. As with any model for security we need to consider attacks what the adversary is allowed to do and success measures when is the adversary considered successful. The adversary is given the global information I and also the public keys of all users. The main novel concern is that the attack model must capture the possibility of an adversary obtaining encryptions of related messages under di erent k eys. To h a v e a strong notion of security, we will allow the adversary to choose how the messages are related, and under which keys they are encrypted. For simplicity we rst address chosen-plaintext attacks only. Some intuition. To get a start on the modeling, consider the following game. We imagine that a message m is chosen at random from some known distribution, and the adversary is provided with E pk 1 m, a ciphertext of m under the public key of user 1. The adversary's job is to compute some partial information about m. To do this, it may, for example, like to see an encryption of m under pk 3 . We allow it to ask for such an encryption. More generally, i t m a y w ant t o see an encryption of the bitwise complement o f m under yet another key, or perhaps the encryption of an even more complex function of m. We could capture this by allowing the adversary to specify a polynomialtime message modi cation function" and a user index j, and obtain in response E pk j m, a ciphertext of the result of applying the modi cation function to the challenge message. After many such queries, the adversary must output a guess of some partial information about m and wins if it can do this with non-trivial advantage. Appropriately generalized, these ideas can be used to produce a semantic-security type notion of security for the multi-user setting, but, as should beevident even from our brief discussion here, it would berelatively complex. We prefer an indistinguishability v ersion because it is simpler and extends more easily to a concrete security setting. It is nonetheless useful to discuss the semantic security setting because here we model the attacks in which w e are interested in a direct way that helps provide intuition. Indistinguishability based approach. The adversary is provided with all the public keys. But unlike in the single-user indistinguishability setting of Section 2, it will not run in two phases, and there will be no single challenge ciphertext. Rather the adversary is provided with n di erent oracles O 1 ; : : : ; O n . Oracle i takes as input any pair m 0 ; m 1 of messages of equal length and computes and returns a ciphertext E pk i m b . The challenge bit b here obviously not explicitly given to the adversary is chosen only once at the beginning of the experiment and is the same across all oracles and queries. The adversary's success is measured by its advantage in predicting b.
We suggest that this simple model in fact captures encryption of related messages under di erent keys; the statement in the italicized text above is crucial in this regard. Let us see why. Suppose the adversary wanted to obtain ciphertexts of the same message under two di erent k eys pk 1 and The adversary also gets as input the public keys and the global information I.
In the case of a chosen-ciphertext attack the adversary is also given a decryption oracle with respect to each of the n public keys. Note we m ust disallow a query C to D sk i i f C is an output of oracle E pk i LR; ; b . This is necessary for meaningfulness since if such a query is allowed b is easily computed, and moreover disallowing such queries seems the least limitation we can impose, meaning the adversary has the maximum meaningful power. Below we indicate the numbernof users as a superscript.
De nition 3.1 Let P E= K ; E ; D beapublic-key encryption scheme. Let A cpa , A cca be adversaries. Both have access to n 1 oracles, each of which takes as input any two strings of equal length, and A cca has access to an additional n oracles each of which take a single input. Let De nition 3.3 We say that P Eis polynomially-secure against chosen-plaintext resp. chosenciphertext attack in the multi-user setting if Adv n-cpa P E ;I A resp.Adv n-cca P E ;I A is negligible for any probabilistic, poly-time adversary A and polynomial n.
Again complexity is measured as a function of a security parameter that is contained in the global input I, and the latter is generated by a xed probabilistic polynomial-time generation algorithm if necessary.
A general reduction and its tightness
Fix a public-key encryption scheme P E= K ; E ; D . The following theorem says that the advantage of an adversary in breaking the scheme in a multi-user setting can be upper bounded by a function of the advantage of an adversary of comparable resources in breaking the scheme in the single-user setting. The factor in the bound is polynomial in the numbernof users in the system and the numberq e of encryptions performed by each user, and the theorem is true for both chosen-plaintext attacks and chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Theorem 4.1 Let P E= K ; E ; D beapublic-key encryption scheme. Let n; q e ; q d ; t beintegers and I some initial information string. Then
Adv n-cpa P E ;I t; q e q e n Adv 1-cpa P E ;I t 0 Adv n-cca P E ;I t; q e ; q d q e n Adv 1-cca P E ;I t 0 ; q d where t 0 = t + Ologq e n.
The relation between the advantages being polynomial, we o b viously have the following: Corollary 4.2 Let P E= K ; E ; D be a public-key encryption scheme that is polynomially-secure against chosen-plaintext resp. chosen-ciphertext attack in the single-user setting. Then P E= K ; E ; D is also polynomially-secure against chosen-plaintext resp. chosen-ciphertext attack in the multi-user setting.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: We rst consider the case of chosen-plaintext attacks only and then brie y indicate how to extend the argument to the case of chosen-ciphertext attacks.
Let A bean adversary attacking the encryption scheme P Ein the multi-user setting. Assume it makes at most q e queries to any o f i t s n oracles and has time-complexity at most t. We will design an adversary B A attacking the same scheme in the single-user setting so that queries to the rst c,1 users, and the rst r,1 queries to the c-th user, are answered by encrypting the left message, while all queries to users c + 1 ; : : : ; n , and the last q e , r queries to the c-th user, are answered by encrypting the right message. When we run experiment Exp 1-cpa P E ;I B A ; 0, the r-th query to the c-th user is answered by encrypting the left message, so the experiment is the same as ExpH l . When we run experiment Exp 1-cpa P E ;I B A ; 1, the r-th query to the c-th user is answered by encrypting the right message, so the experiment is the same as ExpH l,1 .
Finally we should justify the claim that the running time of B A is t 0 . Here we take advantage of our convention that the time-complexity of the adversary refers to the execution time of the entire underlying experiment rather than just the adversary itself. Thus t includes the time to select n key pairs, so that these actions of B A are not an overhead. Taking the conventions into account the only overhead for B A is to pick the random numberland execute some conditional statements.
We provide a brief sketch of how to extend the proof to the case of chosen-ciphertext attacks. The de nition of the hybrid experiments is the same with regard to how left-or-right encryption oracle queries are answered. Decryption queries are however answered truthfully, using the correct secret key. The adversary B A is given also the decryption oracle D sk where sk is the secret key corresponding to its input public key pk. It proceeds as before. The novel elements is to provide answers to decryption oracle queries. When the query is to D sk i for i 6 = c, algorithm B A can easily provide the answer since it is in possession of sk i . When i = c it provides the answer by invoking its own given decryption oracle. The analysis proceeds as before.
Tightness of the bound. We present an example that shows that in general the bound of Theorem 4.1 is essentially tight. Obviously such a statement i s v acuous if no secure schemes exist, so rst assume one does, and call it P E .W ew ant to modify this into another scheme P E 0 for which Adv n-cpa P E 0 ;I t; q e i s q e n times Adv 1-cpa P E 0 ;I t. This will be our counter-example. The following proposition does this, modulo some technicalities. In reading it, think of P Eas being very good, so that Adv 1-cpa P E ;I t is essentially zero. With that interpretation we indeed have the claimed relation.
Proposition 4.3 Given any public-key encryption scheme P Eand integers n; q e we can design another public-key encryption P E 0 such that for any I and large enough t we h a v e Adv n-cpa P E 0 ;I t; q e 0:6 and Adv 1-cpa P E 0 ;I t 1 q e n + Adv 1-cpa P E ;I t :
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Let E be the encryption algorithm of the given scheme P E .Modify the encryption algorithm so that with probability 1=nq e it returns the message to beencrypted in the clear, together with some at that indicates it is misbehaving". The new scheme P E 0 has the same key generation algorithm has the old scheme, this new, modi ed encryption algorithm, and a decryption algorithm obtained by appropriately modifying that of the old scheme. The new decryption algorithm is just like the old one unless it sees the ag in the ciphertext it is provided, in which case it returns the message that accompanies the ag. Now, in the multi-user setting, each of the nq e encryption queries can result in the mis-behavior with probability 1=nq e , so the adversary can win the game except with probability 1 , 1 =nq e nqe 1=e. Thus, the probability that the adversary wins is about 1 , 1=e 0:6. On the other hand in the single user setting, the probability o f getting the encryption function to mis-behave i s a t most 1=nq e . If the pathological event does not occur the adversary is faced with the task of breaking an instance of the old scheme. This intuition can be turned into a formal argument by providing an explicit reduction. We omit the details. An analogous result holds in the chosen-ciphertext attack case, and we omit it.
Improved security for DDH based schemes
The security of the schemes we consider is based on the hardness of the Decisional Di e-Hellman DDH problem. Accordingly we begin with de nitions for latter.
De nition 5.1 Let G beagroup of a large prime order q and let g beagenerator of G. Let D be an adversary that on input q;gand three elements X;Y;K 2Greturns a bit. We consider the A common case is that G is a subgroup of order q of Z p where p is a prime such that q divides p , 1. But these days there is much interest in the use of Di e-Hellman based encryption over elliptic curves, where G would be an appropriate elliptic curve group. Our setting is general enough to encompass both cases. Our improvements exploit in part some self-reducibility properties of the DDH problem sum- For example when x = 0 and c 6 = ab, the lemma says that a 0 = a but b 0 ; c 0 are randomly and independently distributed over Z q .
El Gamal
As indicated above, our reduction of multi-user security t o single-user security is tight in general.
Here we will obtain a much better result for a speci c scheme, namely the El Gamal encryption scheme over a group of prime order, by exploiting Lemma 5.2. We x a group G for which the decision Di e-Hellman problem is hard and let q a prime be its size. Let g be a generator of G. The prime q and the generator g comprise the global information I for the El Gamal scheme. The algorithms describing the scheme E G= K ; E ; D are depicted below. The message space associated to a public key q;g;X is the group G itself, with the understanding that all messages from G are properly encoded as strings of some common length whenever appropriate.
Algorithm Kq;g We noted in Section 1.4 that the hardness of the DDH problem implies that the El Gamal scheme meets the standard notion of indistinguishability of encryptions cf. NaRe, CrSh , and the reduction is essentially tight: Adv 1-cpa E G ; q;g t is at most 2Adv ddh q;g t. We w ant to look at the security of the El Gamal scheme in the multi-user setting. Directly applying Theorem 4.1 in conjunction with the above w ould tell us that Adv n-cpa E G ; q;g t; q e 2q e n Adv ddh q;g t 0 4
where t 0 = t + Ologq e n. This is enough to see that polynomial security of the DDH problem implies polynomial security of El Gamal in the multi-user setting, but we want to improve the concrete security of this relation and say that the security of the El Gamal scheme in the multi-user setting almost does not degrade with respect to the assumed hardness of the DDH problem. The following theorem states our improvement.
Theorem 5.3 Let G be a group of a large prime order q and let g be a generator of the group G. Let E G= K ; E ; D be the El Gamal public-key encryption scheme associated to these parameters as described above. Let n; q e ; t beintegers. Then The 1=q term is negligible in practice since q is large, so the theorem is saying that the security o f the encryption scheme is within a constant factor of that of the DDH problem, even where there are many users and the time-complexities are comparable.
Proof of Theorem 5.3: Let A bean adversary attacking the El Gamal public-key encryption scheme E Gin the multi-user setting cf. De nition 3.1. Suppose it makes at most q e queries to each of its n oracles and has time-complexity at most t. We will design an adversary D A for the Decisional Di e-Hellman problem cf. De nition 5.1 so that D A has running time at most t 0 and adversary A as a subroutine. D A will provide for A as input public keys pk 1 ; : : : ; p k n and global information q;gand will simulate for A the n LR oracles, E pk i LR; ; b for i = 1 ; : : : ; n . W e use the notation A ! i; m 0 ; m 1 to indicate that A is making query m 0 ; m 1 to its i-th LR oracle, where 1 i n and jm 0 j = jm 1 j. We use the notation A C to indicate that we are returning ciphertext C to A as the response to this LR oracle query. The security improvement over that provided by the naive hybrid argument is achieved by using the self-reducibility properties of the DDH problem in several ways. We are letting R denote the algorithm of Lemma 5. independently distributed over G, so that they again have the proper distribution of public keys for the El Gamal cryptosystem, because R was called with x = 1 6 = 0 . Now letting x; y; z be such that X = g x ; Y = g y ; K = g z , with probability at least 1 , 1=q it is true that z 6 = xy mod q. 
Cramer-Shoup
Now we consider another speci c scheme, namely the practical public-key cryptosystem proposed by Cramer and Shoup, which is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack in the single-user setting as shown in CrSh . We are interested in the security of this scheme against chosen-ciphertext attack in the multi-user setting. Let us de ne the basic scheme. Let G be a group of a large prime order q and let g be a generator of G. Note that the last term is negligible for any reasonable values of n; q e ; q d due to the fact that q is large. So comparing with Equation 8 we see that we have essentially the same proven security for n users or one user when each encrypts q e messages.
The reduction we got for Cramer-Shoup is not as tight as the one we got for El Gamal. We did not avoid the factor of q e in a degradation of security of Cramer-Shoup for the multi-user setting. However it is still an open problem to avoid the factor of q e even when there is only a single user encrypting q e messages, so our result can be viewed as the optimal extension to the multi-user setting of the known results in the single-user setting.
To obtain this result we use Lemma 5.2 and modify the simulation algorithm from CrSh .
Proof of Theorem 5.4: We will focus on proving the result in the case that q e = 1 . Namely Given this, the statement of the theorem follows via a hybrid argument reducing the case of q e LR encryption queries per user to the case of a single LR encryption query per user while allowing the advantage to grow by a factor of q e . Since this hybrid argument is simple and standard |it can bedone along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.1| we omit it and proceed to the crux of the proof which is the case q e = 1 . In this case we have to show h o w w e are avoiding the appearance of a factor equal to the numbernof users in the bound on the advantage.
Let A be an adversary attacking the Cramer-Shoup public-key encryption scheme CSin a multi-user setting. We are assuming that it makes at most one query to each o f i t s n LR encryption oracles, at most q d queries to each of its n decryption oracles and has time-complexity at most t. We will design an adversary D A for the Decisional Di e-Hellman problem. The adversary D A takes as input q;g 1 ; g 2 ; u 1 ; u 2 , where g 1 ; g 2 ; u 1 ; u 2 have the form g;g x ; g y ; g xy respectively or they are all random elements in G. We derived this algorithm by adapting the simulation from CrSh to the multi-user case and then weaving in the Di e-Hellman self-reducibility algorithms to improve the quality of the reduction.
We apply the algorithm R of Lemma 5.2 to D A 's input challenge values n times to produce n triples g 2;i ; u 1 ;i ; u 2 ;i . The resulting g 2;i values will be a part of a corresponding public key. Then we create n pairs of public and secret keys. Using these keys we are able to answer all encryption queries of A and also all its decryption queries.
We now analyze D A . First consider Exp ddh-real q;g D A . In this case the input to D A has the form q;g;g x ; g y ; g xy . We can read this also as q;g 1 ; g 2 ; u 1 ; u 2 , where u 1 = g y 1 and u 2 = g y 2 . Then the algorithm of Lemma 5.2 produces n pairs of u 1;i ; u 2 ;i having the same properties. As CrSh, Lemma 1 shows, in this case the algorithm produces valid ciphertexts for A and the outputs of the decryption oracle have the right distribution. Also CrSh, Lemma 1 states that under this kind of simulation the adversary's view is almost indistinguishable from that in the actual attack, except that a decryption oracle may accept with small probability a n i n v alid ciphertext. The proof of CrSh, Lemma 1, Claim holds for the setting with n users, since their resonings can be applied to each user independently. Speci cally, let P 0 denote the probability that an invalid ciphertext is accepted by the simulator in the case b = 0, and P 1 the same when b = 1 . Then In this case, the input values u 1 ; u 2 to D A above are uniformly distributed over G. Then the algorithm R outputs n values u 1;i ; u 2 ;i , which are also random. We show that the proof of CrSh, Lemma 2 can be generalized for the case with n users each making at most one LR encryption oracle query. First we consider the CrSh, Lemma 2, Claim 1 . We want to show that if the decryption oracle rejects all invalid ciphertexts, then the the distribution of the challenge bit b is independent from the adversary's view, where the adversary now is in a multy-user single-query setting. Consider the point Q = z 1;1 ; z 2 ; 1 ; : : : ; z 1 ;n ; z 2 ;n 2 Z 2n q . Let w i = log g 1;i g 2;i and then u 1;i = g r 1;i 1 ; u 2 ;i = g wr 2;i 1 . From the public keys the adversary gets n linear relations i = 1 ; : : : ; n : z 1;i + wz 2 ;i = log g 1 h i
From the outputs of the LR encryption oracles the adversary gets n relations i = 1 ; : : : ; n : e i = u 1 ;i z 1;i u 2;i z 2;i m b Now for for each guess of the challenge bit the adversary can consider the following n relations: r 1;i z 1;i + wr 2 ;i z 2;i = log g = w 1 : : : w n r 2 ; 1 , r 1 ; 1 r 0 2;1 , r 0 1;1 1 , 0 1 : : : r 2 ;n , r 1;n r 0 2;n , r 0 n 1 n , 0 n 6 = 0 ; if r 1;i 6 = r 2;i ; r 0 1 ;i 6 = r 0 2;i ; i 6 = 0 i for every 1 i n.
Case 3. u 0 1 ; u 0
2 ; e 0 6 = u 1 ;i ; u 2 ;i ; e i and 0 = i for some 1 i n. As CrSh shows, this case would imply that the family of hash functions is not universal one-way, which i s a c o n tradiction.
Summarizing these results we can say that the distribution of the hidden bit b is independent from the adversary's view except if one of the following events occurs: a decryption oracle accepts an invalid ciphertext, a collision is found for hash function H, o r R outputs u 1;i ; u 2 ;i of the form g y i 1 ; g y i 2 i for some y i and i = 1 ; : : : ; n . Let P 2 denote the probability of the last event. Since the latter event can happen at any o f n times the algorithm is called with probability 1 =q, w e h a v e P 2 = n=q. Let P 0 0 denote the probability that an invalid ciphertext is accepted by the simulator in the case b = 0 , and P 0 1 the same when b = 1 . Then The claim about the time-complexity o f D A follows from the fact that the only overhead for D A is the time of running the algorithm R a total of n times, where t 0 = t + On T exp q .
